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Trade Credit Use in Agricultural Cooperatives: 
Pricing and Firm Performance 
 
Gregory McKee, Keri L. Jacobs, and Albert Kagan  
 
Abstract  
Retail prices of products sold by agricultural input cooperatives are set according 
to a variety of factors, which may include the cost of offering products on trade 
credit.  A sample of over 300 total pricing decisions for six inputs sold by input 
cooperatives to their members is used to analyze whether that trade credit 
volumes and the cooperative’s own financial needs tend to affect retail input price 
changes.  We find that increased trade credit, at levels observed in this sample, 
tended to increase price inflation.  The net combined effect on price inflation 
reflects upward pressure due to increasing risk associated with trade credit and 
downward pressure from an increase in through-put quantity.  We find no effect 
on price inflation related to a firm’s internal need for funds as measured by 
liquidity or solvency measures.  Finally, our results suggest that co-ops may not 
be pricing products using a “cost plus” approach, but rather based on their local 
market conditions and the need to drive sales.  We discuss these results in the 
context of the role of the cooperative.  
  
Keywords: cooperatives, retail price, marketing, trade credit, liquidity 
  




Agricultural retailers fulfill an important role as intermediaries in 
financing producers’ purchases through the extension of trade credit: an 
arrangement where the farmer purchases and uses agricultural inputs such as seed, 
nutrients, crop protectants, and fuel with financing provided by the retailer.  The 
expectation is that the farmer makes payment at harvest.  Trade credit may 
become an increasingly important source of financing in sustained low-margin 
environments, when producers’ access to capital from traditional lenders is costly 
and restricted as well as when cash flow management tightens due to timing of 
operations and unexpected market conditions.  From the retailer perspective, trade 
credit can be advantageous as a mechanism to create a competitive advantage in 
the marketplace and to generate financing income and margins on potentially 
more sales than without trade credit.  Particularly in competitive and/or low-
margin periods, agricultural retailers face an incentive to ‘bundle’ the sales and 
financing of production inputs to prevent erosion of sales or perhaps to gain a 
competitive advantage.  However, trade credit creates a cost to the firm: the use of 
liquidity to finance sales on credit competes with the firm’s internal need to fund 
short and longer-term investments. Trade credit may expose the cooperative to 
default risk.   
Firms offering trade credit must balance the costs and benefits of doing so, 
and a primary balancing mechanism relates to the pricing of trade credit goods.  
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Whether the retail input supply cooperatives’ pricing structure responds to 
changes in their own internal need for funds and trade credit conditions is an 
empirical question and the primary focus of this paper.   
Literature: Trade Credit as a Pricing Mechanism 
Farm input supply cooperatives provide trade credit to their members 
when on-farm liquidity is good and as well in circumstances where liquidity 
concerns are not robust.  Trade credit facilitates a cooperative’s profitability by 
meeting producers’ short-term liquidity and financing needs not met from outside 
the cooperative system, particularly in periods of constrained liquidity.  
Cooperatives have an incentive to provide credit on sales as a risk management 
strategy to individual producers and to facilitate the organization’s purchasing 
volumes.   
Trade credit 
Applying trade credit to the sales transaction has been widely employed 
by vendors since the 1980s (Emery, 1984; Lee & Stowe, 1993; Petersen & Rajan, 
1997; Smith, 1987). Trade credits are used to expand product sales, enhance 
buyer/seller relationships, and serve as an integral part of marketing strategies 
(Hill, Kelly, & Venkiteshwaran, 2015; Petersen & Rajan, 1997; Wilson & 
Summers, 2002). Firms that use trade credit range from small 
retailers/wholesalers to large corporate entities. The implementation of the trade 
credit process oftentimes serves as an alternative financing option for firms 
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experiencing cash flow issues or when access to conventional operating capital 
tightens (Hermes, Lensink, Lutz, & Thu, 2016; Wilson & Summers, 2002).  
The prevalence of trade for short term credit needs is reported to be nearly 
80 percent for wholesale transactions in the UK (Seifert, Seifert, & Protopappa-
Sieke, 2013). Conversely, Tirole (2010) surmises that nearly 80 percent of 
product offerings are facilitated via trade credit terms in U.S. firms.  Elliehausen 
and Wolken (1993) conclude that many non-financial U.S. firms may have up to 
15 percent of their accounts payable financed by trade credit offerings. Barrot 
(2016) concludes that because of trade credits, accounts payable are substantially 
greater (up to triple) in amount than bank financing funds and as much as 15 
times greater than commercial paper commitments on the cumulative balance 
sheets of non-bank (financial U.S.) businesses. Together, these figures suggests 
that a targeted trade credit strategy may be a critical consideration in a firm’s 
overall business financing process (Fabbri & Klapper, 2016; Hill, Kelly, &, 
Venkiteshwaran, 2015; Petersen & Rajan, 1997). 
With the widespread use of trade credit across business sectors, the 
overarching benefits from the seller side are support of customer relationships, 
product sale enhancements, and revenue generation. Buyers tend to benefit from 
trade credits by having non-conventional credit access, financial stability during 
liquidity-constrained periods, plus the consistency of product availability.  As a 
marketing strategy, acceptance of the trade credit model supports suppliers: this 
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approach serves as both a liquidity contributor allowing for continued business 
operations (during financial stress) and the ability to offer a stability factor that 
will sustain the customer dyad (Cunat, 2006). The bottom line is that a strategy of 
maintaining customers is more beneficial than acquiring new customers within 
economic downturns.  
Trade credit and input marketing 
The use of trade credit by input supply cooperatives has not been 
examined in the literature. However, the broader trade credit literature is clear 
about the major motivations for its use that are relevant to this analysis: to 
facilitate transactions; to mitigate capital market constraints; and to capitalize on a 
competitive advantage in the marketplace.  Particularly relevant in the agricultural 
context is the transactional view of trade credit:  matching the timing of payments 
with the timing of receipts of goods or services results in large one-time payments 
and impairs cash flow in seasonal industries such as agricultural production.   
Trade credit is an important service input supply cooperatives provide 
member-producers, particularly during times of constrained access to capital to 
finance short-term input needs.  Trade credit practices facilitate sales volume 
benefits at the cooperative level, but may come at a cost to the cooperative in 
terms of repayment risk and competition for internal needs for funds.  These 
trade-offs suggest there is a cost to offering the trade credit, and this cost is 
bundled with the good (associated with the trade credit).  Data from retail input 
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supply cooperatives in Nebraska and Iowa are used to investigate the relationship 
between retail prices of goods commonly sold with trade credit and factors related 
to a firm’s internal need for funds (liquidity and leverage) which change a firm’s 
trade credit sales.  
Trade credit is a mechanism that allows firms to sell and deliver products 
and services to buyers where payment for these items is delayed.  While trade 
credit itself has a stated price (i.e., the firm may charge a finance fee to reflect the 
riskiness of credit or length of payment period), the true price or cost is bundled 
with the good or service being sold, and the bundled price reflects the need to 
compete in a market for the good.  In this way, product pricing is dependent on 
credit.  Further, the need for credit depends on the relative availability of credit 
between sellers and buyers.  Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) model the link 
between mark-ups and liquidity constraints.  One of their findings relevant to this 
analysis is that price mark-ups are higher during recessions and lower during 
periods of economic growth. This result derives from relative liquidity constraints 
of firms, with financially constrained firms engaging in a greater mark-up of 
prices than less-constrained ones. 
 Smith (1987) argues that trade credit and its terms reflect information 
asymmetry between sellers financing buyers of varying default risk and who are 
making non-salvageable investments.  In this context, information asymmetry is 
the motivation for varying trade credit terms and rates, which are screening 
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devices that equilibrate activities.  Buyers and sellers both optimize over trade 
credit terms:  buyers select among firms offering trade credit by maximizing the 
return to borrowing based on an interest rate and borrowing cost; a seller extends 
trade credit to maximize its return subject to the rates and the probability of buyer 
default, revealed through the buyer’s choice of financing costs.  The asymmetric 
information motivation for trade credit contrasts with the view of trade credit as a 
financial tool, whereby buyers are passive and sellers use trade credit as a pricing 
strategy to exploit or mitigate a firm’s relative liquidity constraints through price 
mark-ups on trade credit goods (Chevalier & Scharfstein, 1996; Schwartz, 1974). 
Conceptual Framework   
The retail price of a good is a function of the quantity sold and costs 
related to supplying the good (production costs). In turn, production costs are 
related to the wholesale cost of the good to the retailer and the cost of credit 
extended in marketing the good to farmers. Thus, the retail price of good 𝑖 n any 
period 𝑡 can be expressed as a relationship between the marginal cost of the good 
(the wholesale price, 𝑀𝐶 , ) and a markup, ∝ , the firm may charge related to 
supplying it: 
 𝑝 , 𝑓 ∝ , , 𝑀𝐶 ,  (1) 
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For good 𝑖 the retail price change between periods 𝑡 1 and 𝑡, assuming no 
structural wholesale prices changes or shocks, is related via the markup, ∝ ,  , of 
the price in the earlier period.  This retail price change is:   
 𝑝 , ∝ , 𝑝 ,  (2) 
The mark-up factor, ∝ ,  is a function of changes in quantity sold, changes in 
input costs, changes in the cost of credit extended in marketing the good, and 
changes in firm-specific factors.  These changes are firm distinctive and time 
varying.  
Elements of the price markup factor ∝ ,  relate to credit costs. In a 
perfectly efficient credit market, patrons of the cooperative are able to borrow 
money from any source. However, the transactions costs of obtaining operating 
credit from commercial lenders for a single purchase make obtaining trade credit 
from the cooperative an attractive option.  The costs of issuing credit are assumed 
to be factors under management control, and managers consider the probability of 
nonpayment and the consequences of credit risk to the financial condition of the 
cooperative. The non-zero expected costs of non-payment induce the firm to add a 
cost to the retail price of inputs, effectively raising the price for a transaction 
obtained through trade credit to be greater than the cash purchase price.   
Funding trade credit is another component of the price markup factor.  The 
balance sheet is the source of funds used to finance the trade credit. Trade credit 
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availability is a function of the firm’s sales volume, asset size, and substitutes for 
credit repayment in the firm (i.e., liquidity and profitability). Trade credit 
availability is also a function of the competing needs for funds in the firm, 
represented by cash, working capital, and leverage. Increasing demands on the 
substitutes for credit repayment and competing needs for cash within the firm may 
induce the cooperative to add a cost to the retail price of inputs purchased on trade 
credit, presumably making it a greater price than a similar cash transaction. 
Markup on a retail good sold on trade credit in successive years can be 
expressed using average prices.  Cooperatives charge an average retail cash price, 
𝑝 , , for good i in year t, or an average retail credit price, 𝑝 , . The credit price is a 
function of the cash price, the maturity of the trade credit term, and an interest 
rate: 
 𝑝 , 𝑝 , 𝑒 , 𝑒 ,  (3) 
where m is the annualized proportion of sales made using trade credit, and r is the 
implicit interest rate the cooperative charges a patron purchasing on credit, both 
of which are specific to the cooperative and time varying.   
The retail credit price inflation rate relates the trade credit prices between 







Journal of Cooperative - 84 
 
 
A second group of factors are those that affect the internal implicit cost of 
funds. These factors include the shadow price of liquidity, which is dependent 
upon a cooperative’s profitability, working capital, and leverage. The implicit cost 
of funds is higher for cooperatives with less liquidity, lower profitability, less 
working capital, and greater leverage. Cooperatives should be less inclined to 
increase the total amount of trade credit available when internal funds are needed 
to meet the firm’s cash or loan repayment requirements. 
Two research questions emerge from this framework.  First, is there 
evidence of a relationship between a cooperative’s use of trade credit and retail 
credit price inflation on trade credit products the cooperative supplies?  Second, if 
there is, does this relationship manifest differently during periods of firm 
illiquidity?  Using firm-level data from agricultural input supply cooperatives, this 
study examines empirically the relationship between cooperatives’ use of trade 
credit and retail input price inflation.  Also identified in this process are the co-op 
specific factors that may affect retail input price inflation, measures indicative of 
profitability, sales, capital investments, and the cooperative’s internal need for 
funds.   
Data and Statistical Method   
To interpret the cooperatives’ retail price behavior and trade credit use as 
well as whether product pricing seems to respond to the identified factors internal 
and external to the firm, a novel set of data from two sources is constructed.  First, 
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average retail prices and sales quantity data on input products sold to producers 
are obtained from 18 agricultural cooperatives operating in Nebraska and Iowa. 
Annual data are available for years 2014 through 2018. The input products are 
aggregated into six product groups: dry and liquid fertilizer products, anhydrous 
ammonia, gasoline, diesel, and propane.  Most cooperatives in the sample sold all 
of these products.  These data result in 374 input price-quantity observations of 
individual input supply products.  For purposes of regression, the price-quantity 
data are categorized into product groups. However, the granularity of input 
product data within each group permits observation of retail price inflation rates 
and preserves the heterogeneity of pricing decisions across cooperatives. 
Second, audited year-end cooperative financial data from the same 
cooperatives for the same time period are obtained.  These data include 
information from the year-end income statement and balance sheet as well as 
information about trade receivables – the value of trade credit sales for the goods 
purchased by producers. When combined with the price and quantity data by 
product good categories, differences in financial conditions over time and across 
cooperatives can be analyzed to determine their contribution to pricing behavior.  
The analysis exploits a time period—2014 to 2018—in which commodity prices 
were relatively low and stable.   
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The variable of analysis is the change in the rate of retail price inflation, 
defined as the natural log of the ratio of the average retail price for product group 
𝑖 between periods 𝑡 and 𝑡 1, expressed as: 
 





These data contain observations of price changes for each of the six product 
groups.  
A key interest is estimating the effect trade credit sales have on retail price 
inflation.  Trade credit introduces costs to the cooperatives and influences 
repayment risk, which in turn could impact negatively a cooperative’s financial 
condition.  A weighted average of all sales on trade credit and contracted credit 
terms cannot be directly observed in the data.  Absent transaction-level 
observations of the repayment terms (e.g. term length), a proxy variable that is the 







The variable 𝑚 ,  represents the proportion of total sales of the product goods that 
are considered as the outstanding trade credit. Normalizing by total sales of the 
same product goods, a measure of the relative use of trade credit across 
cooperatives is determined; this approach also applies across time.  
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Beyond trade credit, the marginal effects of a cooperative’s financial 
conditions and operational outcomes—e.g., leverage, investments in fixed assets, 
sales, and earnings—are potentially important factors to understanding 
cooperatives’ retail pricing decisions.  Based on evidence from the literature, an 
incorporation (McKee & Kagan, 2019) of the following firm- and time-variant 
covariates and controls are incorporated into the modelling effort: the log of the 
proportional change in quantity sold across periods; the log of property, plant, and 
equipment as a ratio of total assets; the log of total sales; the ratio of earnings as 
measured by earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization 
(EBITDA) to current assets this period; the ratio of working capital to total assets; 
the ratio of average trade credit sales to total sales; the square of the trade credit 
ratio; and the ratio of debt to total assets.  A binary variable, 𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑, identifies 
periods of firm-level illiquidity, where a current ratio of less than 1.4 indicates a 
lower-quartile measure.  The illiquidity term is interacted with the firm’s current-
period (debt-to-asset ratio (DTA), property, plant and equipment (PPE) ratio, and 
trade credit ratio to capture the marginal effects on price inflation arising from 
weak liquidity conditions within the firm. 
These covariates and controls generate the following general empirical 
model: 
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𝛿 𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑥 𝐷𝑇𝐴 , 𝛿 𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑥 𝑃𝑃𝐸 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 ,
 𝛿 𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑥 𝑚 , 𝜖 , , 
(7) 
where 𝐼𝑛𝑡  is a product-group dependent intercept, T is an annual time trend 
controlling for time-invariant differences in input price inflation, and 𝐹𝑒𝑟𝑡  allows 
a separate response for fertilizer products.  Firm-level fixed effects were included 
in an initial estimation of this model to control for time-invariant differences in 
cooperative pricing behavior; none were found to be statistically significant in this 
sample and were omitted.  
The model is estimated using pooled OLS regression.  The relatively small 
number of cooperatives in the sample renders panel analysis incomplete. To 
answer the research questions, the following hypotheses are tested.  Regarding 
research question 1, the relationship between a cooperative’s use of trade credit 
and product price inflation is captured in the sign and significance of 𝛽 , 𝛽 , and 
𝛿 .  For research question 2, the effect of periods of firm illiquidity on retail price 
inflation, the sign and significance of 𝛿 , 𝛿 , 𝛿 , and 𝛿 is observed.  In essence, 
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this study seeks to identify whether sales (via retail sales prices) is an instrument 
of risk management and benefits generation. 
Results   
Table 1, panel A, summarizes input retail sales for the study cooperatives, 
including pricing and quantity, between 2014 and 2018.  The data show no clear 
trajectory in pricing for any of the six input groups. In general, the average retail 
price for each input declined between 2014 and 2017, then increased in 2018.  
Data summarized in panel B of table 1 shows the contemporaneous changes in the 
financial condition of cooperatives in the sample.  Liquidity, measured as the ratio 
of current assets to current liabilities, declined during the period.  Likewise, the 
ratio of long-term debt to total assets increased on average, signaling greater 
leveraged positions during this time. 
Changes to trade credit and the cooperative’s overall financial condition 
occurred at the same time prices adjusted. As a percent of input sales, trade credit 
receivables also changed. In 2015 (the earliest year for which trade credit data are 
available in the sample) trade credit was 7.55 percent of input sales, then 6.24 
percent, 8.54 percent and 9.06 percent in 2016, 2017, and 2018, respectively. The 
change in this percentage was moderately significant between 2016 and 2018 
(p=0.066), which is evidence that trade credit availability was adjusted to 
facilitate sales, and further, that an increasing fraction of sales were not 
immediately paid for, on average.  There was also movement in average bad debt 
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expense as a percent of trade receivables during this period, increasing from 0.06 
percent in 2016 (the first year with bad debt data in the sample) to 0.33 percent in 
2018, a weakly significant increase (p=0.100).   
A combination of declining liquidity, increasing leverage, and some 
indications of changing trade credit conditions suggests one or a combination of 
these factors may be related to retail input pricing pattern changes. Correlation 
analysis of these items, with absolute changes in price, appears in table 2. The 
variable significantly related to absolute, year-over-year, changes in price, is 
EBITDA to total assets.  The volume of trade credit and the ratio of trade credit 
and input sales are not significant. These correlations suggest it may be the firm’s 
financial condition, specifically liquidity, not the cooperative’s trade credit 
conditions, that explain firm pricing behavior in these product groups. 
Pooled OLS regression estimates of the empirical model for retail price 
inflation are in table 3.  A test for collinearity among regressors was conducted by 
calculating the variance inflation factor (VIF) for the coefficients in equation 7; 
model fit statistics indicate overall model significance. 
The model estimates in table 3 provide evidence about the role of both 
internal funding needs and repayment risk as determinants of retail input price 
inflation.  The first column, labeled Model 1, includes the full set of covariates 
that may have explanatory power or be useful controls.  The second column – 
Model 2 – eliminates regressors with the least explanatory power to arrive at a 
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more concise model. When models 1 and 2 are compared, the elimination of 
statistically insignificant variables increases the precision of the coefficient 
estimates of some variables, e.g., log of sales and trade credit.   
This study’s first research question is about the relationship between a 
cooperative’s use of trade credit and retail credit price inflation.  Results from 
Models 1 and 2 indicate incentives exist for patrons to use the cooperative. An 
increase in overall quantity of inputs sold, with all else equal, reduces the rate of 
price inflation. Evaluating the estimated coefficient for a 10 percent increase in 
quantity sold reduces the average rate of inflation by 4.6 percent.  
The results also suggest a rationale for price inflation. The estimated 
marginal effects of the trade credit term, 𝑚 , , are positive and significant, and the 
quadratic trade credit term is relatively larger, has a negative sign, and is 
significant. These results suggest a concave relationship between a cooperative’s 
provision of trade credit and retail price inflation during periods of relative 
liquidity. The extension of more trade credit, on net, creates incentives to increase 
retail prices. By decomposing the total consequence of adding trade credit, the 
linear positive term is present which implies increasing trade credit increases 
price inflation. However, the negative quadratic term appears to temper that 
effect, which is the through-put function effect that helps to moderate price 
inflation. For instance, the average trade credit in the sample is $8.5 million; 
average sales are $338 million.  Evaluating the model for an increase in trade 
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credit to $8.6 million (a one percent increase in trade credit as a share of sales), 
while holding sales constant, generates a net change (sum of the term credit and 
term credit squared variables) on the log of the change in sales by 0.30, or about a 
25% increase in the ratio of price in period t to t-1, with all else equal.   Likewise, 
a tightening of trade credit or restriction of its use is expected to result in negative 
price inflation.  Prices during the study’s research period for many product 
categories were falling from 2014 – 2017 (see table 1a).  These results reinforce 
the importance of sound credit policies to mitigate retail price inflation associated 
with trade credit applications. 
The second research question examines retail price inflation experiences 
during periods of illiquidity, when 𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 , 1.  Recall that we defined relative 
illiquidity as a current ratio less than 1.4.  Neither the illiquidity variable nor 
interactions with measures of capital needs, i.e., DTA or plant investments, are 
associated with changes in retail price inflation.a  Experiencing a period of 
illiquidity does not appear to influence the relationship between trade credit and 
retail price inflation, suggesting managers do not look to price changes to finance 
 
a The lack of significance regarding liquidity’s effect on pricing could be driven 
by the fact that while the cooperatives in this study experienced mild illiquidity 
according to balance sheet measures, they did not experience severe liquidity 
conditions during the study period. 
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investments in working capital. This result reveals a potential benefit of 
cooperatives’ pricing strategies.  The cooperatives do not appear to pass along 
their internal liquidity needs to patrons in the form of higher prices on retail 
goods, exemplifying the risk-management and pooling functions of producer 
cooperatives.  This benefit is particularly valuable if firm-level liquidity and 
financing constraints are contemporaneous with patron illiquidity.   
Estimates from model 2 provide insight about the financial and operational 
factors that may influence retail prices of input products to producers.  An 
increase in a product’s sales quantity over the last period relates to a reduction in 
prices for that product in the current period, evidence that cooperatives may 
reduce prices to drive sale quantities.  In addition, the estimated coefficient on 
total sales (measured in dollars) is positive and significant, corroborating evidence 
that sales (dollars) may be higher under this strategy.  The PPE ratio coefficient 
estimate represents information about retail price responses to capital 
expenditures on permanent assets:  an increase in the relative size of PPE puts 
upward pressure on retail prices of input products.  This result is plausible in the 
context of financing expansions internally versus seeking debt sources to finance 
expansions.  It is notable that prior-period earnings and working capital do not 
help explain variations in retail price changes, although this lack of explanation is 
consistent with the lack of significance in the illiquidity binary variable. 
Discussion  
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The model estimates offer salient insights into the firm-specific 
mechanisms that may reduce the incentive, or need, to increase retail input prices. 
Marginal modifications to existing trade credit policies (e.g. lower credit limits or 
shorter credit repayment periods) may lead to increases in retail input prices.  On 
the other hand, a growth in trade receivables suggests cooperative managers are 
comfortable increasing the availability of inputs for sale while balancing changes 
to nonpayment risk.  One question that emerges is whether strategies to improve 
the collection of current accounts could be valuable tools for price stability: 
extensive collection intervention that would affect current assets could affect 
inflation pressures through their effect on the EBITDA to current assets ratio.  
Asset growth can reduce incentives for price increases since this can lead 
to additional sales. Increased profits, through efficiency and not through price 
inflation, can reduce these incentives since profits become a substitute for internal 
cash needs. Conversely, strategies to increase total sales, without concurrent 
adjustments to profitability, assets, and working capital, tends to increase 
incentives that lead to raising retail prices on farm inputs.  Finally, the regression 
estimates provide some compelling evidence to suggest that cooperatives may not 
rely on retail price inflation as a mitigation mechanism when faced with internal 
illiquidity constraints.  Investments in fixed assets seem to contribute to retail 
input price inflation, though the additional debt load, measured by the DTA ratio, 
may not be driving this result regardless of the liquidity situation. The positive 
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relationship between relatively more PPE and retail price inflation likely signals 
greater cash flow and liquidity needs being met through higher prices.     
Conclusion 
Agricultural input supply cooperatives face incentives to change their 
retail input prices. A sample of cooperatives, retailing inputs during a period of 
relative financial distress for their patrons, was evaluated to examine whether 
internal needs for funds or repayment risks were determinants of retail price 
inflation. Our findings suggest a positive relationship between retail prices for 
common agricultural input goods and the use of trade credit to finance them.  We 
also find that increases in physical assets (investments) are associated with 
increases in retail prices.  However, neither earnings (EBITDA) nor solvency 
(DTA), common measures of a firm’s financial condition, were observed to affect 
retail price inflation.  An important take-away is that cooperative managers should 
recognize that while trade credit usage can have a positive effect on through-put 
of products, an equilibrium should be determined to balance producers’ input 
needs while safeguarding against repayment risk. 
This study has limitations. The most obvious is the data sample. 
Cooperatives in two states, marketing inputs to patrons raising the predominant 
crops in these states were observed. Cooperatives serving retailing inputs to 
patrons producing fundamentally different crops with distinct fixed input needs 
may have different results. Certainly, cooperatives only conducting marketing 
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activities would have different results since only retailing to patrons is considered. 
On the other hand, the cooperatives observed in this sample reflect significant 
sales volume, which is representative of input supply by firms in other states 
serving patrons with similar input needs. This pattern may be indicative of the 
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Panel B – Average annual cooperative sales and assets 
 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Sales $310,586,406 $337,497,160 $311,889,629 $302,216,527 $363,184,015 
Assets $70,996,220 $148,843,648 $151,955,426 $154,133,791 $195,310,337 
Current ratio 1.54 1.50 1.48 1.48 1.35 
Debt-to-asset ratio 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.13 
 
  
Table 1. Summary statistics, selected year 
Panel A – Average annual cooperative input price and average quantity 
 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Input Price Qty Price Qty Price Qty Price Qty Price Qty
Dry fertilizer (tons) $523.93 20,059 $505.24 53,566 $464.04 57,365 $389.85 37,475 $414.56 35,306 
Liquid fertilizer (tons) $350.77 16,849 $372.90 47,416 $340.46 43,943 $285.46 96,062 $276.17 114,432 
Anhydrous ammonia 
(tons) 
$713.14 7,511 $631.56 54,043 $568.15 34,332 $477.07 12,834 $463.17 13,010 
Gasoline (gal.) $2.66 3,054,194 $2.18 3,459,957 $2.20 3,515,399 $2.53 4,280,240 
Diesel (gal.) $2.74 6,296,031 $2.21 6,399,778 $2.10 6,119,780 $2.51 6,840,160 
Propane (gal.) $1.47 3,538,037 $1.23 3,099,798 $1.21 2,934,254 $1.42 3,091,832 




Table 2. Correlation of year-over-year absolute retail input price change and other items, 



















Corr. Coeff 0.0207 -0.0074 -0.0493 0.0212 -0.0100 -0.0793 0.2329 
p-value 0.7338 0.9032 0.4170 0.7272 0.8696 0.1913 0.0001 
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Table 3. Pooled OLS Regression Product Price Inflation Models 
 Model 1 Model 2  
























































Illiquidity x Trade Credit Term 3.734 3.282 
 
(0.33)   (0.378) 
 
R2 0.462 0.459   
Note: Significance levels indicated as: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. P-values are in 
parentheses. 
 
